

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The making of the Amazonian subject: state formation and indigenous mobilization in lowland Peru

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ABSTRACT

This article examines the links between state formation and indigenous mobilization in the southeastern Peruvian Amazon. Through an ethnographic and historical analysis, the article explores how processes of state formation in the Madre de Dios region have drawn indigenous people into complex interactions with outsiders. The article argues that these social relations, which are characterized not simply by resistance but also by subjugation, have shaped the Arakbut people's struggles for land rights. Recent Arakbut engagements with a multinational oil corporation are informed by patron–client networks that work as a governmentality technique. By creating debt and exacerbating internal divisions, clientelism disciplines indigenous people, undermining their resistance to oil development and other forms of predatory state expansion into their territories.

KEYWORDS

Clientelism; governmentality; indigenous politics; Peru; social capital; state formation

In October 2009, a group of Arakbut people jumped into their long-tail boats and took to Madre de Dios River, in southeastern Peruvian Amazon. They sailed upriver for 3 days, recruiting about 200 indigenous people from several communities along the river. Their objective: to reach the small town of Salvación and to occupy the base camp that Hunt Oil, a United States oil corporation, had installed in preparation for seismic exploration within Arakbut ancestral territories. The rally, called by the Federation of Native Communities of the Madre de Dios River and its Tributaries (Federación de Comunidades Nativas del Río Madre de Dios y Afluentes [FENAMAD]), was aimed at forcing Hunt Oil to halt its operations. Nevertheless, upon arriving at Shintuya, a community close to Salvación, the protestors were not joined by their fellow natives. The Shintuya dwellers had previously come to an agreement with Hunt Oil that allowed the corporation to explore for oil within their titled community lands in exchange for financial compensation. The unity of FENAMAD's member communities against Hunt Oil had been broken.

The origin of these tensions dates back to 1989, when community delegates, gathered at a FENAMAD congress, proposed the creation of a communal reserve as a strategy to prevent illegal loggers from entering indigenous hunting and fishing grounds that had not been included in the lands titled to native communities

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(García 2003).[1] In 2002, after more than 10 years of petitioning and of mass demonstrations organized by FENAMAD, the state finally agreed to create the Amarakaeri Communal Reserve for the use of the Harakbut, Matsigenka, and Yine communities adjacent to the reserve. Nevertheless, in 2005, the state granted Hunt Oil a concession to explore for oil and gas in Block 76, one of the many areas for hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation into which the Amazonian region has been divided. Covering an area of 1,434,026 ha, Block 76 overlapped a large part of the reserve and the territory of some of its bordering communities. Both the state and Hunt Oil failed to adequately consult with the native communities on oil activities within the reserve, despite the fact that Peru has been a signatory of the International Labor Organization's Convention 169 since 1994, which mandates consultation with indigenous peoples on issues that may affect their interests and rights. Also, in order to ease Hunt Oil's access to the reserve, government officials made the reserve's zoning more permissive to resource extraction within ecologically sensitive areas. FENAMAD considered the oil corporation to be a threat to the reserve and the indigenous livelihoods derived from it, demanding the immediate withdrawal of the company. Shintuya and Puerto Luz, however, dissented from FENAMAD and allowed Hunt Oil in their communal lands.

This account raises important questions about indigenous organizing in Amazonian and other Latin American contexts. Are tensions between indigenous federations and their constituent communities intrinsic to indigenous politics? Are they the result of corporate strategies to create division within indigenous organizations? Indigenous Amazonians have a long history of interaction with the outside world. From the time they were first incorporated into the Peruvian nation-state, many indigenous peoples of the Amazon have established relations with a wide array of state and nonstate actors, including missionaries, settlers, officials, anthropologists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and corporations. In the last decades, however, the rise in international prices for commodities and the expansion of extractive activities as the main component of macroeconomic development have led to an increase in both interaction between private companies and indigenous people and pressure to open up indigenous territories. In this article, I explore how recent indigenous responses to the extractive industry on a Peruvian Amazonian frontier are informed by processes of state formation and the complex social relations to which they give rise. I show that native engagements with outsiders, which are characterized not simply by resistance but also by subjugation, shape the ability of indigenous people to mobilize collectively in defense of their land claims.

In the next section, I discuss the relevance of social capital theory for understanding the role of social relations in indigenous political mobilization, arguing that in addressing tensions internal to indigenous activism, an approach focusing on state formation and government technologies proves more productive than a focus on the intensity of social interaction. Then I analyze historical processes of state formation in Madre de Dios and how they conditioned indigenous people's ability not only to build social capital but also to organize themselves for political mobilization. In the last section, I examine recent indigenous engagements with extractive economies and the way vertical networks with Hunt Oil work as a technique of governmentality that erodes indigenous resistance to oil development.

This article is based on 14 months of ethnographic research I conducted among the Arakbut of Madre de Dios between 2011 and 2012, with a follow-up visit in 2013.[2] I carried out fieldwork both in Puerto Maldonado, the regional capital where FENAMAD's offices are headquartered, and in Puerto Luz, one of the federation's constituent communities. I also made brief visits to four other FENAMAD's base communities: San José del Karene, Barranco Chico, Boca Inambari, and Shintuya. Ethnographic data were collected through semistructured interviews and intensive participant observation, while historical data are based on oral history interviews, archival sources, and published literature on the area.

Social capital, state formation, and governmentality

The concept of social capital provides a theoretical framework from which the apparent failure of FENAMAD to keep its constituents united may be discussed. From an economistic approach, social capital has been defined as the social networks, shared norms of reciprocity, and trust that enable collective action (Coleman 1988; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993). Thus understood, social capital would facilitate interaction, encourage mutual obligation, and provide sanctions to defection, while creating trust in the process. Trust in turn reduces the transaction costs of cooperation, assuring compliance with social norms (Coleman 1988). Not only is social capital susceptible to be converted into other forms of capital, but once created, it would act as a 'public good' from which everyone could benefit, even those who did not contribute to it in the first place (Coleman 1988). Social capital might facilitate effective collective action not only at the community level, but also at a national level, where it would explain the presence of economic development and democratic governance (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993). Therefore, the absence of collective action, democracy, or economic prosperity can be seen as resulting from the inability of communities and nations to accumulate 'stocks' of social capital.

Social capital has also been regarded as central for social movements. Scholars of Latin American indigenous movements, in particular, suggest that social capital strengthens the capacity of indigenous organizations to help their constituencies gain access to rights and resources (Bebbington 1997; Bebbington and Perreault 1999; Perreault 2003). Social capital – in the form of communities, federated grassroots organizations, networks with nonlocal actors, and shared identity – is seen as strengthening negotiation capacity and facilitating access to land titles, education, credit, infrastructure, development projects, and new markets, thereby contributing to enhanced and more sustainable livelihoods.

One would assume that because indigenous people in Madre de Dios have a dense associational life, expressed in the existence of a regional indigenous federation and 33 native communities affiliated to it, they hold large amounts of social capital and hence enjoy high levels of collective action. However, evidence shows the contrary. Although the region has a vibrant history of indigenous organizing, the natives are still poor, collective action in communities is weak and intermittent, and FENAMAD suffers from recurrent internal tensions. This poses questions about the effectiveness of indigenous organizations in Madre de Dios: Is FENAMAD's failure to keep constituent allegiance a result of indigenous people's inability to build up durable solidarity bonds among

communities and between themselves and the federation? Or is it instead an example of the inability of existing social capital to bring broad benefits to the indigenous people? A discussion of the limitations of the economistic understanding of social capital will provide us with a framework to address these questions.

Despite its great influence on both the academic and international development arenas, the economistic approach to social capital is not exempt from analytic pitfalls. Critics of this perspective have pointed to its failure to distinguish between different forms of social capital and the varying amounts of public good that can be derived from it (Fine 1999; Harriss and De Renzio 1997). Advocates of social capital tend to focus on formal organizations, or to see different organizations as equal expressions of social capital or as having only positive effects. Nevertheless, in real life individuals engage in multiple social ties and associations that might differ in their social effects. Critics talk about the 'downside' of social capital, as in criminal or terrorist organizations whose unlawful activities are also based on social networks (Landolt and Portes 1996). Still others have distinguished between bonding or 'strong' ties (e.g., kinship and ethnic-based networks) and bridging or 'weak' ties (crosscutting networks), asserting that while the former strengthen solidarity within small groups, the latter bring social cohesion to the broader society (Granovetter 1973; Holzner 2004; Narayan 1999).

Pierre Bourdieu (1986) pointed to one of the most important theoretical lapses of dominant views of social capital: their lack of attention to the material, symbolic, and political dimensions of social networks. As individuals and groups are socially differentiated, social capital tends to be unevenly distributed and thus to reproduce social inequalities (Bourdieu 1986). Some groups may have more power than others to build social capital and to convert it into other forms of capital (especially economic capital) (Mosse 2006). The need for economic capital may force the poor to engage in highly disadvantageous networks with the rich, in which case social capital may be used to dominate and to exploit. Also, historical legacies of horizontal relations are necessary but not sufficient to ensure the formation of social capital. The political opportunity structure may condition the ability of horizontal ties and organizations to form alliance networks (Fox 1996). A Bourdieusian approach questions the very theoretical foundations of the economistic model of social capital and its emphasis on rational actors seeing social relations and organizations as a resource to achieve individual and collective benefits. Here, I advocate an anthropological view of social capital that focuses on social relations, the meanings and moralities that drive persons and groups to connect (McNeill 2007), and the power structures that constrain networks and associations or condition their power and reach (Mosse 2006), an approach that can better account for the complexities and ambiguities of social capital.

Since their contact with the national society, the Arakbut have engaged in multiple networks with powerful others. These social relations have had differing effects on the natives' ability to organize collectively the defense of their territorial rights. While bridging ties have enabled indigenous people to gain resources and to form organizations, bonding ties have often encouraged factionalism among them. In the past decades, structural exclusion from fundamental rights, resources, and opportunities have forced indigenous Amazonians to engage in bonding ties, especially clientelism, with corporation actors in order to gain access to resources, a situation that inhibits the natives' capacity to build trust and cooperation. Clientelism (also known as patronage

and patron–client relations), in its anthropological meaning, refers to reciprocal relations between actors (individuals or groups) of unequal power, whereby the powerful actor (or patron) provides the weak (or client) with economic aid and protection, while the client responds with services and political support for the patron (Weingrod 1968).[3] This article seeks to demonstrate that the Arakbut's clientelist networks with Hunt Oil produce antisocial effects (internal divisions and poverty) that undermine their ability to face the drawbacks of oil development.

The economic, political, and cultural dimensions of social networks can be better understood if they are analyzed as a result of processes of state formation. In the last decades, anthropologists have turned their interest to the study of the state, questioning the idea of the state as a centralized, unified, and clearly bounded apparatus that concentrates power over society and is built independently from and above society (Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Gupta 1995). They suggest that the state should rather be understood as an unfinished, contested process that can be apprehended only through the analysis of historically and ethnographically informed local contexts (Das and Poole 2004; Krohn-Hansen and Nustad 2005). From this perspective, there is no clear boundary between state and society, since the state may align its interests with those of nonstate entities, and the latter may assume functions of the former. This idea applies well to the Peruvian Amazonia. The character of the Amazon as a frontier region, with an apparent absence or weakness of the state, has not configured a situation of power vacuum, because government has been exercised by rubber traders, missionaries, colonists, and, more recently, mining and oil corporations. All these nonstate actors undertook government practices that ultimately produced what Timothy Mitchell (1999) called 'state effect.' Promoting colonization, establishing missions, and granting rubber and oil concessions have been particularly instrumental to the state in tapping new natural resources, in claiming sovereignty over territories disputed by bordering countries, and in incorporating indigenous groups to the nation and market economy. State formation also involves the creation of specific subjectivities that enable the state to control populations, generally by ordering subjects into categories and forcing them to conform to them (Baitenmann 2005; Scott 1998). In this article, I suggest that the construction of new forms of government in Madre de Dios has conditioned the Arakbut's ability to build social networks and the nature of these networks.

In the past decades, technologies of neoliberal governmentality have become the dominant form of state formation. Drawing on Foucault's (1991) idea of 'governmentality,' Ferguson and Gupta (2002) have coined the term 'transnational governmentality,' by which they refer to the transfer of government functions to transnational nonstate agencies and the production of new subjectivities that have taken place with the advent of neoliberalism. Neoliberal governmentality is accomplished through the restructuring of state government toward self-discipline (or 'technologies of the self'). Neoliberal subjectivity is guided by a market rationality that represents subjects as skilled and amoral corporate businesses capable of making autonomous decisions, taking risks, assuming responsibility, and building partnerships with other corporate actors, all of which encourage the subjects to discipline themselves (Gershon 2011; Lemke 2001; Rose 1996). An example of communities' consent to neoliberal subjectivity in Latin America is their engagements with corporations under the moral discourse of corporate social

responsibility, according to which patronage relations with corporations are seen as 'partnerships' that equally distribute responsibility and risks (Babidge 2013). Since the 1990s, the Peruvian state has strongly embraced neoliberal policies that encouraged the rolling back of the state from its role in promoting development in the countryside, as well as the outsourcing of this state function to transnational corporations. In this context, Arakbut engagements with multinational corporations can be understood as shaped by technologies of neoliberal governmentality that have eroded the natives' ability to shape relations with outsiders in their own terms. The clientelist networks that some Arakbut have built with Hunt Oil have worked as a government mechanism that disciplines the natives by creating community dependency upon the corporation and engendering tensions within and among communities.

From the corporatist state to the neoliberal state

The Madre de Dios region remained isolated for much of Peru's colonial and republican history. It was not until the rubber boom (1880–1920) that the Peruvian state began to incorporate this region and its native population. While other Harakbut groups were contacted and decimated at the outset of the rubber boom, the Arakbut managed to take refuge in remote areas until they were finally contacted by Dominican and Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL) missionaries in the late 1950s. At that time, the region was still poorly connected to the rest of the country, mainly because of the lack of state resources to promote large-scale colonization and to provide infrastructure. In this context, as they played a key role in pacifying the natives, whose resistance threatened colonization expansion and resource prospecting, the missionaries became instrumental to state interests.

The Dominicans carried out their proselytization work in mission stations, where the Arakbut experienced changes in their social organization and patterns of consumption. The missionaries relied on gift giving (especially of metal tools and Western medicine) to contact and later attract the Arakbut to the missions. Hundreds of Arakbut people, some of them enemies, were concentrated in mission posts, which caused their traditional *malocas* (communal houses) to split into smaller groups (Fuentes 1982, 167; Torralba 1979). This in turn engendered tensions and a realignment of power relations among the natives, for those groups closer to the priests gained in power. Also, in order to avoid being ridiculed by more acculturated native groups, the Arakbut abandoned the use of *malocas* and the practice of puberty rituals (Moore 1979). Missionization also spurred indigenous dependence upon Western goods, which was used by the Dominicans to develop debt-peonage relations with the natives and to retain them as workforce. Debt-peonage is a form of coercive labor recruitment and retention based on the advancement of goods and the debt it creates, which is later paid off with labor. It became a generalized form of recruiting native labor in the Amazon once the rubber boom, and the enslavement practices on which it was based, collapsed. At the mission of Shintuya, for example, the priests controlled goods (clothes), services (school, health center), and work in lumbering, cattle ranching, and coffee cultivation, activities on which the economy of the mission was based. They even decided whom the natives could marry. The priests granted access to resources and women only to those individuals who

behaved according to Christian precepts and showed obedience (Wahl 1987, 259). The priests also absorbed the mission's profits themselves and marketed any surplus the natives produced, keeping native interaction with traders, dealers, and other representatives of the national society to a minimum. Thus, by preventing the natives from developing autonomous relations with outsiders, the missionaries assured for themselves the advantageous role of intermediaries.

Trapped into debt-peonage relations with the priests, the Arakbut were unable to revolt against the exploitative conditions to which they were subject in the mission. These social conditions were similar to the paternalistic relationships hacienda owners established with peasant farmers in the Peruvian highlands and other Latin American regions. Hacienda indigenous servants gained access to land and other resources through interpersonal relations with the patron, not with other peasants, a closed system that Peruvian sociologist Julio Cotler depicted as a 'baseless triangle' (Cotler 1969). As the system prevented them from communicating with each other, hacienda workers were kept socially fragmented, incapable of rising up against the patron. Similarly, at Shintuya, debt-peonage generated competition among the natives over access to resources and women, which ultimately bred resentment among those who lost out (Gray 1996, 252; Wahl 1987, 272–3). According to my informants, rather than aggression toward the priests, these tensions expressed themselves through sorcery accusation and murder among the natives.

To avoid debt-peonage with the priests, between 1969 and 1974, the Arakbut fled Shintuya and made their way back to their homelands, where they regrouped in new communities.[4] Away from the missionaries' intermediary role, the Arakbut were able to establish marriage alliances between kin groups again, both within and outside their recently formed settlements. They were also free to engage in independent relations with mining settlers coming from the nearby Andean highlands. Increased numbers of impoverished Andean peasant farmers, prompted by the loss of their lands at the hands of hacienda owners, had been migrating into Arakbut territory since the early 1960s, settling around gold placers that at the time were poorly regulated by the state.[5] My interviews suggest that relations between Arakbut and mining settlers were as important as those among Arakbut kin groups. The Arakbut learned from the colonists how to wash alluvial gold, an activity that would soon become a key component of their livelihood. Despite being economically and politically less powerful, the Arakbut were able to affirm ancestral rights to land and to maintain their relations with the miners in rather symmetrical terms of reciprocity. In Boca Inambari, for instance, the Arakbut would allow the settlers to mine gold within their territory in exchange for mining equipment, which enabled the natives to carry out this activity in an independent way. Gold mining soon turned into a source of cash that the Arakbut needed to purchase the goods and services on which they had become increasingly dependent since the time of the mission.

Breaking the missionaries' role as the sole mediators with the broader socioeconomic system thus represented for the Arakbut the possibility of not only avoiding clearly exploitative debt-peonage relations, but also of regaining control of their territories, of forging independent relations with outsiders, and of engaging autonomously in the market economy through gold mining. This increased social interaction had its limitations, however. My interviews indicate that as the population of Puerto Luz grew and tensions between families erupted, the village split into several clusters of households

(or residence groups).[6] Gold mining, which was first practiced communally, became a household activity, as were most activities performed by the highly self-sufficient Arakbut households. In addition, the large geographical distances that separated the new Arakbut settlements made it difficult for the natives to establish larger alliance networks.

Changes in the way the state was built in the Amazon since the late 1960s further facilitated the Arakbut participation in the gold-mining economy. In 1968, a group of military reformists led by General Juan Velasco Alvarado took power in a coup and carried out left-leaning modernization policies that involved greater state control of the industrial, financial, and service sectors (Lowenthal 1975). In Madre de Dios, this new policy translated into increased state control of gold mining, which until then had remained rather unregulated. Between 1972 and 1974, following a substantial rise in the international price of gold, the military regime established in the region several branches of the state-run Banco Minero (Mining Bank), which monopolized gold commercialization and provided the miners with tools, food supplies, and other provisions at subsidized prices (Moore 1979). The government also suspended the issuing of mining concessions, replacing them with permits that were given to a limited number of miners that had been previously registered by the Banco Minero (Pacuri and Moore 1992). This increased state regulation of gold mining held the number of incoming miners and competition with the natives over gold placers in check. The inability to compete with the cheaper prices of the Banco Minero prevented mestizo traders and miners from positioning themselves as patrons (Moore 1979; Pacuri and Moore 1992). The absence of patrons that could replace the role played before by the missionaries, as well as the provision of cheap mining supplies by the Banco Minero, facilitated the Arakbut engagement in gold mining.

The Velasco administration also implemented corporatist reforms that had a major impact on indigenous Amazonians. First, through the creation in 1971 of the National System to Support Social Mobilization (Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social [SINAMOS]), the military regime sought to garner the support, and to coopt the political participation, of popular classes. During the first half of the 1970s, SINAMOS supported the formation of several indigenous federations in the Amazon (Morin 1992). Second, as part of its radical agrarian reform, the government passed in 1974 the Law of Native Communities to encourage agricultural development and colonization in the Amazon. The new law mandated the reorganization of indigenous settlements along cooperative lines, thus creating *comunidades nativas* (native communities) that conferred the natives official recognition and collective property rights to land for the first time in Peru's history.[7] This way, the native community, not the ethnic group, became the first Amazonian subject, since only as members of native communities indigenous people may assert citizenship rights. By the late 1970s, mining settlers, who began to arrive in increased numbers, stopped engaging in reciprocal relations with the Arakbut and instead invaded their lands. The Arakbut thus saw in their recognition as native communities and in collective land titles an opportunity to legally defend their lands.

The two processes of community formation described above had effects on the Arakbut's ability to build up social capital. Forming communities, whether to restore a disrupted social fabric or to defend threatened lands, resulted in a form of social capital based on bonding rather than bridging networks. Social ties and the solidarities to

which they gave rise were therefore concentrated at the residence group level, and strengthened the connections between natives and mining settlers (Pinedo 2014). While these social networks helped the Arakbut to regain social viability and to gain access to economic capital, they were less effective in fostering linkages between residence groups, communities, and ethnic groups. Despite the state efforts to impose collective land tenure and management at the level of community, the fragmentary nature of the Arakbut social organization prevailed. The loosely connected residence groups continued to be the main economic and political units.

Additionally, collective mobilization for official recognition and land titles spurred the formation of community-based identities within Arakbut settlements. The need to collectively defend demarcated communal territories from external threats gave rise to a sense of place belonging that configured local identities in opposition to colonists, corporations, and even the members of other native communities.[8] As Rubenstein (2001) puts it, the formation of the state in the Amazon has taken place through the construction of new territorial and social boundaries. This collective self, however, was not flawless. First, collective action was highly dependent on the shared perception of an external threat. Once this threat vanished, the community would return to its atomistic state. Second, community identity would work alongside, and sometimes in tension with, the more fluid and relational forms of indigenous territoriality, which do not necessarily imply the rejection of the presence and resource claims of outsiders. The Arakbut have therefore structured their engagements with other territorial actors in rather contradictory ways. While collective identity enables the natives to defend their territories against outsider threats, traditional forms of indigenous territoriality allow for reciprocal engagements with outsiders.

President Velasco was overthrown in 1975 by General Francisco Morales Bermúdez, whose government (1975–1980) signaled a shift toward liberal and privatizing policies (Dean 2002, 211). More interested in opening up the Amazon forests to private corporations, the new administration drastically cut state funds earmarked for community land titling. In addition, under Morales Bermúdez, a new mining law was enacted that ceased the Banco Minero's monopoly of gold trade and reestablished the granting of mining concessions to private companies. As a result, almost all lands claimed by the Arakbut were petitioned as mining concessions by medium-sized miners and large national and transnational mining companies. Further, due to a new rise in gold price in the early 1980s, mining colonists started to arrive by the thousands in Arakbut territory. Neither the small mining colonists nor the natives were able to secure mining concessions because of the highly expensive requirements and fees, which forced the former to work for holders of large concessions or to seize indigenous lands (Moore 1983; Pacuri and Moore 1992). All this spurred a gold rush in Madre de Dios, which experienced gold extraction at a scale never seen before.

Many Arakbut communities saw their territories encroached upon by corporations and mining settlers. By 1980, none of the Arakbut communities had been able to obtain titles to their lands. The Law of Native Communities was contradictory in that while it acknowledged land rights to the natives, it also made it difficult for them to obtain land titles. Applying for community land titles was and still is a long, complicated, and expensive process. Moreover, the Arakbut were not able to use the judicial system to defend their land rights. Lack of financial resources, either because of poverty or

cutbacks in government funds, prevented the Arakbut from requesting land titles or filing lawsuits against squatters. Additionally, communities were geographically isolated and few Arakbut spoke Spanish – the language spoken by officials and in which official documents are written – or were familiar with laws and bureaucracies. Even if the natives managed to apply to the authorities for eviction of the intruders, the economically and politically more powerful corporations and settlers colluded with the authorities and had their own interests served. Outsider encroachment of Arakbut communities thus caused soil erosion in agricultural areas, deforestation (Moore 1983, 421–2; Pacuri and Moore 1992), and the loss of important gold placers, which threatened to deprive the Arakbut of their ability to making a living through gold mining. The Arakbut therefore had no choice but to take up their bows and arrows and physically throw the invaders off their lands, which led to a series of violent altercations with settlers and corporation workers.

Community mobilization, however, was insufficient to contain the increasing invasion of indigenous lands. It thus became more apparent that the defense of indigenous lands would require forging larger and more permanent alliances among communities. This had already happened in other parts of the Peruvian Amazon, where indigenous federations were made possible by the formation of communities, a process that enhanced communication, solidarity, and cooperation among indigenous kin-based settlements (Veber 1998). Yet, geographical distance among Arakbut settlements and long-term rivalries and tensions between them and other ethnic groups were major obstacles for organization and mobilization. Furthermore, the Arakbut had neither previous experience at forming organizations beyond the settlement group nor funds to undertake it. In this context, networks with outsiders were especially important in helping the Arakbut to obtain the resources needed to set up organizations capable of mobilizing several communities.

The Morales Bermúdez dictatorship was propitious for the forging of these networks. The government not only reduced funds for titling community lands, it also shut down SINAMOS in 1978, which marked the end of state intervention in popular organizing (Yashar 2005, 236). This political conjuncture favored the proliferation of civil society actors that took over the state role in supporting the natives to obtain land titles and to form organizations for the defense of their territories and cultures. For example, a group of anthropologists who had formerly worked for SINAMOS founded the Center for Amazonian Research and Promotion (Centro de Investigación y Promoción Amazónica [CIPA]), an NGO that in 1979 helped four Harakbut settlements to demarcate their communal borders (Rummenhoeller, Cárdenas, and Lazarte 1991). Also, Thomas Moore, an American anthropologist, supported the Arakbut to secure financial resources and personally provided them with technical assistance to form FENAMAD in 1982. During those years, similar processes of construction of indigenous networks with global NGOs and indigenous rights activists unfolded in other parts of the Peruvian Amazon and in other Latin American contexts (see Brysk 2000; Greene 2006).

FENAMAD soon became a network hub that worked to create identity and bonds of solidarity among its member communities. Yashar (2005, 246) has pointed out that the political violence associated with the guerrilla movements of the 1980s and early 1990s foreclosed the ability of indigenous people to form networks and political associations. While the impact of guerrilla violence was less pervasive in Madre de Dios as in most

parts of the Peruvian Amazon, the Arakbut still had to face government hostility toward indigenous mobilization. My informants told me that while on their way from their communities to Puerto Maldonado, the Arakbut were often arrested at military check points, accused of not having identity cards or driving permits for their boats. In this context, it was the work of FENAMAD and its allies that provided the necessary conditions for the building of transcommunity ties. By constantly bringing together the heads of communities, who otherwise would not have had much contact, the federation improved communication between distant communities and facilitated collective decision-making. Moreover, the federation called, funded, and led protests in the form of strikes, rallies, and demonstrations in Puerto Maldonado, in which community members took active participation. Engagement in these meetings and protests enabled indigenous people to put aside their ethnic rivalries, making possible the existence of FENAMAD as a multiethnic federation.

Not only did FENAMAD contribute to build networks among communities, it also helped the natives break dependence upon local patrons and to circumvent patronage relations with the state. Unlike other cases in which missionaries encouraged the formation of indigenous federations in the Amazon, in Madre de Dios the Dominicans saw FENAMAD as defying their patronage role, and opposed it from its very inception.[9] In the mid-1980s, Shintuya's Spanish priest Ignacio Irairoz used his control of labor in the mission's sawmill and cattle ranch as well as his monopoly on gasoline supply to prevent native delegates from attending FENAMAD meetings in Puerto Maldonado. The Shintuya natives thus saw in FENAMAD an opportunity to free themselves from the priest (Thomas Moore, personal communication). Further, in the absence of a strong central state in Madre de Dios, regional authorities (e.g., judges, the police, and the military) allied with and represented the interests of exploitative mining patrons. In the districts and provinces further away from Puerto Maldonado, traders and patrons themselves were elected as mayors and council members, monopolizing public funds in their own interests and those of small miners and native communities who backed them in the elections (Gray 1997, 84). FENAMAD represented an alternative to these clientelist ties. With the technical and financial support of Centro Eori, an NGO founded by Thomas Moore, the federation helped several Arakbut settlements to obtain land titles,[10] to bring numerous legal charges against the abuses of miners and authorities, and to obtain concessions for gold deposits located within their communities, a strategy used to halt the advance of mining settlers into indigenous lands (Pacuri and Moore 1992). Networks with indigenous rights activists were also key to obtain the external support to launch a federation campaign that broke state opposition to the creation of the Amarakaeri Communal Reserve and a reserve for the protection of indigenous people in voluntary isolation (FENAMAD 1993).[11]

Building up alliance networks with anthropologists and NGOs made it possible for the Arakbut not only to face state policies that threatened them, but also to bypass local power structures that marginalized them. This is not to say that Arakbut relations with activists were always harmonious, nor that over time NGOs would not attempt to patronize the natives. In fact, the Arakbut would increasingly seek to gain autonomy from NGOs and anthropologists and to exert greater control of FENAMAD. What I want to emphasize here is that indigenous brokerage relations with indigenous rights activists reduced power asymmetries in the region, allowing the natives to avoid potentially

clientelist relations with the state, its allies, and political parties. Nevertheless, indigenous political organizing in Madre de Dios was not followed by increased indigenous control of the regional state, which has remained in the hands of the mestizo people more closely identified with the interests of miners and oil corporations.

Neoliberal governmentality: oil boom and clientelism

One morning in Puerto Luz, I ran into some outsiders. The logo that adorned the baseball caps and khaki shirts they wore indicated to me their connection to Hunt Oil. They were standing at the school, where they had piled several cardboard boxes containing Christmas gifts for the children. After exchanging greetings with the locals, Silvana Lay, the leader of the Hunt team, went into a classroom and talked about the importance of oil and natural gas for the country's development. Her inappropriate language, however, seemed to confuse rather than convince the kids. Lay also quizzed the children, handing out presents to those who answered correctly. 'We have come to reward you for a great academic year,' she explained while being filmed by a Hunt's cameraman. Some Arakbut women showed up and asked presents for their preschool children. They were given some caps and balloons. Later that morning, the team headed toward the communal house, where they would hold a meeting with officers and other members of the community. The first minutes of the meeting were tense, as community members were angry at Hunt Oil, which was not acting as expected. The natives complained that the company had not been providing assistance to the sick and that it had not covered the travel expenses for Arakbut people willing to attend a dance festival in Puerto Maldonado. The community headman, supported by some elders, demanded the Hunt staff to meet their requests for support. But Lay would not assent easily. After clarifying that since the company was not making any profit yet, it was not able to meet every community demand, she added: 'In order to resume our assistance, we need the community to sign an agreement giving its consent to Hunt's work in Puerto Luz territory.' The headman took advantage of the situation and requested Lay to donate beer for the celebrations of the community anniversary. 'You are cordially invited to stay for the fiesta and try local food, if you want,' he replied. Lay politely declined the invitation, but offered to provide fuel for the community's power generator. As she explained, because there was still no written agreement, her offer was a gesture of goodwill.

This event is a clear example of how Hunt Oil resorts to patronage in order to hamper community open opposition to its oil development project, a tactic that is common among multinational oil companies planning to drill for oil within indigenous territories (Sawyer 2004). Hunt Oil channels its resources into goods, services, and gifts in exchange for community consent. Much of this resource delivery is in fact part of the compensation the company is bound to provide communities for any environmental damage or economic loss it may cause to their lands. Yet, Hunt Oil publicizes compensation as a token of its generosity.[12] During my time in Puerto Luz, the corporation had agreed to compensate the community for the use of its lands and the ecological and economic damages caused by the seismic lines opened during its prospecting activities, several of which went through the lands of the community. This compensation included a monthly supply of gasoline for the community's power generator, supplies for the school, and

support to the sick through health campaigns and emergency evacuations to Puerto Maldonado or Cuzco. To strengthen its image as a benefactor, the company also regularly delivered gifts to the community, such as toys and fruitcake during Christmas time, and rides to Puerto Maldonado. The corporation also set out to secure community compliance by hiring and even bribing indigenous leaders, who in return were expected to persuade other members of their communities to comply with Hunt's oil project. As a result, some families agreed to the presence of the company so long as it provided goods and services to the community.

These tactics have certainly worked as a divide-and-conquer strategy that results in tensions both within and among communities. The arrival of Hunt Oil in the communities of Shintuya and Puerto Luz has divided their members into those who support the oil company and those who are against it. This new division also exacerbated already existing tensions among residence groups. At the time of my fieldwork in Puerto Luz, much of these tensions had arisen from the partnerships some Arakbut had built with mining settlers, which were seen by other Arakbut as threatening community control over its territory. The resulting mutual distrust and conflict among the natives undermined their ability to reach cohesion and to organize collective resistance to Hunt Oil operations. Once support to the corporation gained prominence among most of their members, both Shintuya and Puerto Luz broke their allegiance to FENAMAD. They demanded the right to be autonomous in their decisions and to negotiate agreements with the company without the mediation of the federation, engendering the enmity of those communities that resisted the company. Support to Hunt Oil by some communities also eroded FENAMAD's campaign against oil extraction within the Amarakaeri reserve. Consequently, despite several eviction threats and attempts by the federation, Hunt Oil has remained within the reserve, where it has recently started opening up several exploratory wells. This does not mean that the federation and the communities are no longer capable of mobilizing against other threats to their rights. For example, in 2012 FENAMAD launched a successful mobilization against government interdiction of gold mining within native communities.

The patronage relations between Hunt Oil and some communities have also affected the long-standing alliance between natives and anthropologists. As I myself was able to experience, some community members, especially where the oil corporation has been operating, are not happy with the idea of anthropologists sticking their noses in community matters. Within the climate of distrust that the presence of Hunt Oil has generated, anthropologists are not necessarily welcome in the communities, which makes it difficult for them to obtain the headmen's permission to carry out fieldwork in their communities. The decline of this alliance, however, is a consequence not only of the present conditions but also of a decrease in the natives' need for external mediation. FENAMAD's bridging role, native participation in the gold mining economy, and, more recently, improvements in communication between communities and Puerto Maldonado have all enhanced connections among communities and native access to the state. Moreover, FENAMAD leaders have built their own networks with global funding agencies and have acquired either knowledge to manage projects themselves or funds to hire advisors. In this new context, the natives no longer depend upon the mediation of anthropologists, who now have to negotiate for a chance to do fieldwork in communities. More than mediators, anthropologists are now seen as hireable experts.

One of the factors underlying the Arakbut's vulnerability to clientelism is the decades of neoliberal policies that have opened up indigenous lands to transnational corporations and have drawn indigenous people into increasing impoverishment. Since the late 1970s, neoliberalism has dominated Peruvian economic policy, although it was during Alberto Fujimori's administration (1990–2000) that some of the most radical neoliberal restructuring reforms were undertaken. Two main components of Fujimori's reforms were the liberalization of extractive industries and the deregulation of land markets. Legislative reforms encouraged private (especially transnational) investment in mining and oil extraction and favored large- over small-scale mining operations (Finer and Orta-Martínez 2010; Pacuri and Moore 1992). The government also facilitated corporate access to community lands by dismantling the last vestiges of Velasco's agrarian reform. A new mining law, for example, stipulated that mining concessions could be granted on agricultural lands. These new policies placed serious threats on indigenous land rights, such as a significant increase in the number of concessions and contracts for oil exploration and exploitation in the Amazon, most of which overlapped the territory of native communities (Finer and Orta-Martínez 2010). In Madre de Dios, multinational corporations such as United States' Mobil Oil and Hunt Oil and China's Sapet were granted concessions and began seismic exploration on the lands of native communities, even without the consent of their members. At the same time, Fujimori's regime decreed free commercialization of gold and closed the Banco Minero, leaving the Arakbut with no access to above-market returns on their gold and with no mining supplies at subsidized prices (Pacuri and Moore 1992).

Other structural adjustment measures implemented under Fujimori made the Arakbut people more dependent on gold mining. The government liberalized the agricultural economy, substantially reducing central government expenditure on agriculture. Cheap credit, subsidies, extension services, and other forms of state support to rural producers were suspended (Crabtree 2002). While these policies had little impact on those small-scale producers that, like the Arakbut, were engaged in subsistence agriculture, they did deprive them of the opportunity to diversify their access to the market and income sources. Logging, handicrafts, and other productive activities did not provide an alternative to gold mining as income generator. Low prices and the lack of roads connecting communities with market centers increased production costs, making handicrafts and forest extraction unattractive economic activities. In addition, as part of his stabilization packages, Fujimori drastically reduced or eliminated government health, education, and social service programs, while unemployment and consumer prices dramatically increased. In this context, the Arakbut relied even more on gold mining, which, boosted by high gold prices during the 1990s and 2000s, provided a level of diversification of the economic base that worked as a shock absorber.

FENAMAD's few attempts to bring economic development to its base communities were not enough to tackle the threats that neoliberal policies posed on indigenous livelihoods. For much of its existence, the federation's main goal was to secure legal protection for the land rights of its member communities rather than to promote development (FENAMAD 1993). The federation sought to provide the natives with development projects only when the communities, once land titles had been obtained, started to demand for employment, education, and healthcare. Nevertheless, the projects that the federation implemented to meet these demands had little impact on the

natives' living conditions (FENAMAD 1996). Most of the funding the federation was able to raise served only to implement small-scale projects – such as provision of high school and university scholarships for community students, traditional health programs, and revitalization of indigenous culture – that did not achieve the intended goals, had short-term impacts or brought only individual benefits (FENAMAD 2007). FENAMAD has implemented only a few large development projects, among which Plan Karene and Wanamei were the most important. In the 1990s, under the premise that the changing prices of gold did not offer the Arakbut a stable source of livelihood, Plan Karene intended to break up Arakbut dependence upon gold mining by promoting revolving funds for breeding small animals. But the project failed to secure the economic autonomy of the natives, who instead became increasingly dependent on gold mining and the cash income it provided (IWGIA, FENAMAD, and DANIDA 1999). Wanamei, a community-run ecotourism agency aimed at promoting the sustainable use of the Amarakaeri reserve while generating income for the natives, failed to generate significant profits to be distributed among the beneficiary communities, bringing benefits only to the families that offered personal services to tourists (Valcuende del Río, Murtagh, and Rummenhoeller 2012).

Although the development projects implemented by FENAMAD did not succeed in meeting increasing community demand for income and basic services, they did redefine the interaction between the federation and its constituents. Patronage-like relations between the communities and the federation developed, as the former often conditioned their allegiance to the latter on the provision of resources. This resulted in part from the competition between the federation and the Dominicans over delivery of resources to the communities. The priests offered the Harakbut communities education facilities, a health program, and lumbering and cattle ranching projects. The communities took advantage of the rivalry between the federation and the missionaries and divided their loyalties according to the capacity of the respective organization to meet community needs (Gray 1997, 268). Over the years, the influence of the Dominican priests decayed and their role in providing the natives with Western resources was taken over by anthropologists and NGOs, and later by the federation. FENAMAD, for example, became more popular among its constituents once it demonstrated its efficacy in getting land titles and solving conflicts with outsiders (Gray 1986, 115).

By the early 2000s, faced with no access to state subsidies for gold mining, the Arakbut found themselves forced into leasing their lands to the mining settlers for capitalization of their operations, which suffered from low levels of productivity. Land leasing also served as an outlet for the still recurrent conflicts with the miners at the time. The tenant miners, who came to be known as *invitados* (guests), paid weekly rent both to Arakbut families and to the community as a whole. Natives and settlers turned to friendship and *compadrazgo* (godparenthood) relations, and the reciprocity moralities they involve, to strengthen their partnership. Known locally as *regalías*, rent became an important source of income for the Arakbut. A few families were able to use *regalías* as capital, which allowed them to buy new mining equipment and to improve their productivity, thus breaking economic dependence upon their *invitados*. For the majority, however, *regalías* continued to be the main supplemental, or even the only, source of income. Rent also became an important source of funds for community coffers, funds that were used mainly to cover the expenses of the continual trips that community headmen had to make to Puerto Maldonado, or to organize the

celebrations of the community anniversary. In San José del Karene, *invitados* helped the community to build a road which the Arakbut had unsuccessfully requested the municipality to provide, while in Boca Inambari, part of the *regalías* were distributed among the elders who lacked family support. Relations with *invitados* reached their extreme limits in Barranco Chico, where the Arakbut leased almost all their lands to *invitados* and left the community to live off their rent in urban centers. Native interaction with mining settlers thus shifted from open conflict to partnership, which did not degenerate into debt-peonage since the Arakbut never worked for their *invitados*. Yet, these relationships have worked against the building of solidarity among community members. When, fearing to lose their communal lands at the hands of *invitados*, the Arakbut of Puerto Luz decided to expel them from the community, the economic benefits obtained from these social ties and the personal loyalties they engendered caused every communal effort to get rid of *invitados* to fail.

Greater dependence on gold mining, however, made the Arakbut more vulnerable to the uncertainty of gold prices and state policies. Indeed, by 2011, gold mining and its ability to provide the Arakbut with income were in decline. In Puerto Luz, gold placers had almost been depleted, which coincided with a downturn in the international price of gold and with the efforts of President Ollanta Humala's government (2011–2016) to eradicate illegal mining in Madre de Dios. The government made gold mining without proper authorization a criminal offense and banned mining operations outside a designated 500,000-ha corridor. Since their communities fell outside this corridor, the Arakbut were not allowed to work gold within their communal lands.[13] As a result, most of the *invitados* left, leaving the natives with less or no income from *regalías*. Therefore, by late 2011 the relations with *invitados* no longer produced the resources the Arakbut needed to face the lack of state support.

The combined effect of state neglect, FENAMAD's inability to meet increasing community demand for economic resources, and the decline of gold mining and partnership with *invitados* seriously deteriorated economic conditions for the natives and increased their dependence on external support. While Arakbut communities are now more integrated and the federation no longer needs the mediating role of outsiders, communities still have to rely on networks with outsiders to get the resources that would allow them to meet their basic needs. This situation provided Hunt Oil with a fertile ground for the development of clientelist relations with the Arakbut. Furthermore, with communities marginalized from resources and political power, Hunt Oil found it relatively easy to use its economic power to create dependence among the natives and secure their support. Despite the company's efforts to present itself as concerned about the social and economic development of indigenous people in the region, the quality of its social provisions has been so poor that they have only negligibly improved the living conditions in the communities. As a result, oil development has not brought social investment to Madre de Dios. Since access to Hunt Oil resources does not substantially improve Arakbut's living standards, the need for more resources is reproduced, thus maintaining patronage relations with the oil company. By providing basic services, employment, and goods to the communities, the company has assumed functions that are conventionally the responsibility of state agencies. But the purpose of delivering these resources to the natives is neither reducing poverty nor acknowledging their rights, but gaining access to oil resources within their lands.

Material conditions are certainly a necessary yet not sufficient explanation of the prevalence of patronage in Arakbut engagements with Hunt Oil. Patronage is also facilitated by Harakbut cultural norms that favor paternalist relations with powerful others. In precolonial times, Harakbut leadership was based on proof of skill and generosity, which were the sources of noncoercive power (prestige and influence). In colonial contexts, the Harakbut have projected their traditional notions of leadership and power onto outsiders, conceiving of missionaries, anthropologists, and mining settlers as powerful leaders because of their access to resources and abilities the Harakbut lack and want to harness. Nevertheless, as with traditional Harakbut leaders, the power of outsiders and the loyalty of their followers depend on their continuing efficacy in garnering resources and showing generosity in their distribution to the communities. The oil corporation has taken advantage of these cultural patterns to carry out its clientelist tactics, often encouraging competition with FENAMAD and downplaying its ability to meet the natives' needs, just in the same way the federation competed with the Dominicans for community allegiance decades ago. In this context, some Harakbut frame their decision to support Hunt Oil within the cultural idiom of reciprocity. As the head of Puerto Luz said to me,

> FENAMAD leaders just come here and tell us not to accept the company. They say each *comunero* [community member] should contribute at least 100 soles to buy petrol. But what they should say is they're going to implement a project to provide the community with electricity or with gasoline for our power generator.

Consider also the case of a Wachiperi man hired by Hunt Oil as a community relations specialist. FENAMAD deemed the Wachiperi's decision to work for the company a betrayal of indigenous people's cause, but he justified it by arguing lack of reciprocity on the part of the federation. The Wachiperi's sister, who is a fierce opponent of oil development within the reserve, recounted to me a conversation she had with her brother: 'Why are you against the company? What does FENAMAD give to you? Does it give you a job or something?' he scolded her. Patronage is today so deeply rooted in the culture of Peruvians that it permeates all kinds of social interaction, much in the way that Bourdieu called 'habitus' (Bourdieu 1977).

The cultural patterns of patronage are strengthened by the hegemonic neoliberal rhetoric of agency. Unlike debt-peonage with the missionaries, which was based on the isolation of the natives and their need of mediation, the current predominance of clientelism stems from the neoliberal understanding of corporations and communities as equivalent and autonomous agents capable of forging connections in corporate terms (Gershon 2011). Money is one of the neoliberal technologies that works as a universal standard facilitating negotiation between actors of highly unequal size and power. In referring to the $380,000 offered in compensation to the Amarakaeri reserve, a Hunt's representative said: 'They can use that money to police the reserve against illegal logging and mining…. We are a good opportunity for the reserve' (Weinberg 2009, 8). The neoliberal model of agency sees the self as a market actor that may decide autonomously how to relate to other actors, a perspective that seems to reinforce the strong desire for autonomy that characterizes Amazonian sociality (Overing 1988). Although FENAMAD was formed to represent and defend indigenous people's interests and rights and to mediate their interaction with the state, communities have

increasingly claimed autonomy from the federation and the right to interact with the larger society without mediation. In this context, Puerto Luz and Shintuya, in part encouraged by Hunt Oil, have neglected FENAMAD's representative role and have sought to deal with the oil company in a direct manner. As the president of Puerto Luz explained to me,

> FENAMAD has never showed concern for the needs of communities. Although it is a federation, our representative, FENAMAD has never sought to support us. The leaders have criticized the community for accepting the oil company. We then, as an autonomous community, have made the decision to let the company in. What I don't like about FENAMAD is that it opposes the company regardless of the community's needs. They have never showed us how to negotiate a deal with the company.

Autonomy is not demanded solely at the community level. As an ex-president of Amarakaeri's Administrative Contract Executive (ECA), the reserve's governing council, once told me: 'FENAMAD wants to control ECA, but ECA is autonomous.' Such claims for political autonomy have facilitated Hunt's access to indigenous lands, since it has been much easier for the oil corporation to negotiate with indigenous organizations individually than to deal with the representative body.

Patron–client ties thus coordinate and consolidate rule in connection to oil extraction in Madre de Dios. Developing clientelist relationships has the effect of fashioning the conduct of the natives both individually and collectively. Constrained by the debt and the moral obligation to reciprocate that clientelism entails, communities refrain from taking action against the oil company. The tensions that patronage ties inflame in native families and communities neutralize any coordinated action that indigenous people may undertake to oppose the company. The breakdown of community allegiance to FENAMAD and the communities it represents demobilizes indigenous resistance to Hunt Oil's extraction project, resulting in the native inability to expel the oil company from the reserve and community lands. The disempowerment of indigenous people in Madre de Dios undoubtedly undermines their capacity to counterbalance the power of predatory businesses and of repressive states, which contributes to state efforts to govern the region. Oil corporations therefore work as a mechanism that introduces discipline to a region rich in natural resources yet inhabited by historically rebellious native people threatening to halt expansive states and corporations.

Conclusion

I have examined how complex and dynamic processes of state formation have shaped political mobilization among indigenous people in southeastern Peru. The history of the Madre de Dios region demonstrates that the ways in which the Arakbut people related to a colonial state engendered social relations that had a defining influence on indigenous political subjectivities and organizational forms. The state regimes that have dominated the country for the past five decades conditioned different social structures that have shaped the natives' capacity for political mobilization. Indigenous people's ability to defend their territories and livelihoods has thus been determined not so much by the presence or absence of an 'inherent' indigenous capacity for collective action, but by

their changing position within the broader power structure. In this sense, state structures do not grow in social capital, they shape social capital (Tarrow 1996, 395).

I have argued that technologies of neoliberal governmentality underlie the current failure of FENAMAD to stop oil drilling within indigenous territories. Patron–client relations between Hunt Oil and the communities work as a form of governance that produce neoliberal subjects in the form of natives that discipline themselves in compliance with state policies. In line with the hegemonic rhetoric of neoliberal subjectivity, the natives claim autonomy and guide their decisions based on market principles. By acting as clients of the oil company, the natives become indebted to the corporation and therefore restrain from resistance. The breaking up of the mediating role of FENAMAD that this entails creates tensions among the federation's constituents, demobilizing indigenous campaigns against oil development. Nevertheless, contrary to the neoliberal rhetoric of free choice, the neoliberal policies that have aggravated poverty conditions in the region compel the natives to negotiate with the oil company as a way to gain access to the resources from which they are structurally marginalized. Factionalism within FENAMAD is therefore not a result of the inability of indigenous people to build social capital or of their falling off of some original state of communitarianism. It is rather the native engagement with corporations through market rationality that, acting as a mechanism of self-governance, has inhibited any collective response to the exploitative relations to which the natives are subject.

This case study challenges the common assumption that indigenous engagements with the state and extractive industries are characterized first and foremost by 'resistance.' I have shown that transnational corporations as forms of neoliberal governmentality have the power to hamper indigenous resistance, not with violence but with the creation of debt. In this context, Arakbut politics have implications for a further understanding of indigenous movements in the Amazon and potentially other contexts. If one assumes that a successful indigenous mobilization is contingent on the unity among communities and between them and their leadership, the current hegemony of transnational governmentality and its divisive effects in Amazonian countries cast a major challenge to indigenous struggles. Neoliberal governmentality, however, does not go uncontested. While recent engagements with extractive industry portray a gloomy picture for the Arakbut, the history of Madre de Dios shows that the same global forces that elevated oil corporations to the status of quasistates have also enabled indigenous people to build networks that challenged state claims of sovereignty over their territories.

Notes

[1]. In Peru, communal reserves are a type of protected area aimed to conserve wildlife for the benefit of neighboring native communities and other local populations. They are coadministered by the state and the beneficiary communities, but ownership remains with the state. Native communities are officially recognized corporate organizations of Amazonian indigenous families with a self-governing body and shared ownership of land. While in this article, the terms 'community,' 'settlement,' and 'village' are used interchangeably, the term 'native community' is used to refer only to those indigenous communities that have received official recognition as such. Native communities will be discussed in more detail below.

[2]. The Harakbut language has several dialects, including the Arakbut and the Wachiperi. In this article, I use the term 'Harakbut' to refer to all Harakbut-speaking groups, and the word 'Arakbut' whenever I make specific reference to the group that speaks the Arakbut dialect. I chose to use the words 'Harakbut' and 'Arakbut' instead of the more generally used terms 'Harakmbut' and 'Arakmbut' because they better represent the phonetics of the Harakbut language. This new spelling has been recognized by the Peruvian Ministry of Education and is how the Harakbut prefer to be called.

[3]. This meaning contrasts with the one used by political scientists, who define clientelism as the ways in which authorities and political parties exchange public jobs and other special favors for electoral support (Weingrod 1968).

[4]. A group of Arakbut *malocas* stayed at Shintuya only for a year between 1962 and 1963, after which they formed the settlement of Puerto Alegre (later to become Puerto Luz), where they remained under the influence of SIL missionaries.

[5]. While gold extraction in the Amazon required a concession granted by the state, in practice anyone could *de facto* appropriate a gold placer.

[6]. This process of fissioning is a common practice among the Arakbut and other Amazonian groups in handling internal conflicts.

[7]. One of the most progressive laws for indigenous people of its time, the 1974 Law of Native Communities granted the natives property rights over both agricultural lands and forests. The subsoil and water resources, however, remained as state property.

[8]. Rosengren (2003) and Veber (1998) have suggested that this collective identity may also have emerged from a sense of belonging to a body organized for collective action.

[9]. See Morin (1992) and Salazar (1981) for accounts of the role of Catholic priests in the formation of ethnic federations in Peru and Ecuador.

[10]. Puerto Luz, for example, received in 1986 a collective title for 38,784 ha of cultivable land, along with a use concession over 18,089 ha of forest.

[11]. Political parties did not represent an alternative to clientelism with the state. Dominated by whites and mestizos, who have often approached indigenous people with racist and authoritarian attitudes, political parties viewed the formation of indigenous federations in the Amazon with suspicion and hostility, or at best tried to absorb and control them (Smith 1996). This tendency to authoritarianism and cooptation created distrust toward political parties among the natives. In this context, FENAMAD took on the role of political parties and worked as a mediator between the indigenous people and the state.

[12]. According to Peruvian legislation, an oil concession grants its holder the right to explore and exploit hydrocarbon resources lying in the subsoil, but not rights to the surface land. When a concession overlaps land owned by third parties, including a native community, the concession holder should request the landowner an agreement about easement (right of occupation, of way, and of transit). If no agreement is reached within 30 days, the state grants the easement and the compensation to the landowner for use, damage, and lost profits.

[13]. While this policy represented a return to state intervention in gold mining after decades of deregulation, it was intended to increase tax collection and to protect the natural environment rather than to regulate the activity.

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